Safety performance comparison between light rail transit and subway by Jasmin, Nehemie
New Jersey Institute of Technology 
Digital Commons @ NJIT 
Theses Electronic Theses and Dissertations 
Fall 1-31-2013 
Safety performance comparison between light rail transit and 
subway 
Nehemie Jasmin 
New Jersey Institute of Technology 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.njit.edu/theses 
 Part of the Civil Engineering Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Jasmin, Nehemie, "Safety performance comparison between light rail transit and subway" (2013). Theses. 
141. 
https://digitalcommons.njit.edu/theses/141 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Electronic Theses and Dissertations at Digital 
Commons @ NJIT. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons 
@ NJIT. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@njit.edu. 
 
Copyright Warning & Restrictions 
 
 
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United 
States Code) governs the making of photocopies or other 
reproductions of copyrighted material. 
 
Under certain conditions specified in the law, libraries and 
archives are authorized to furnish a photocopy or other 
reproduction. One of these specified conditions is that the 
photocopy or reproduction is not to be “used for any 
purpose other than private study, scholarship, or research.” 
If a, user makes a request for, or later uses, a photocopy or 
reproduction for purposes in excess of “fair use” that user 
may be liable for copyright infringement, 
 
This institution reserves the right to refuse to accept a 
copying order if, in its judgment, fulfillment of the order 
would involve violation of copyright law. 
 
Please Note:  The author retains the copyright while the 
New Jersey Institute of Technology reserves the right to 
distribute this thesis or dissertation 
 
 
Printing note: If you do not wish to print this page, then select  















The Van Houten library has removed some of the 
personal information and all signatures from the 
approval page and biographical sketches of theses 
and dissertations in order to protect the identity of 






SAFETY PERFORMANCE COMPARISON BETWEEN 





Along with the expansion and addition of guide way transit systems, such as light rail and 
subway, there came the need to compare the safety performance of each mode. The 
multimodal transportation systems with many different technologies, operating 
characteristics and diversified environments made it more difficult to compare their 
safety.  
In order to evaluate the potential for intermodal comparison of safety performance 
measures, the thesis has focused on the subway and Light Rail Transit (LRT) modes at 
the national level. Starting with clear definitions of each safety category, the analysis 
utilizes mostly the National Transit Database (NTD) from recent years to estimate the 
impact and implications of various safety performance measures. A series of comparisons 
between LRT and subway on various fatality, injury and property damage categories 
demonstrates that accident rates may be unstable and easily distorted when the 
operational base is small. With increasing number of operations, the accident rate may 
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This study examines the safety performance of light rail and subway in the U.S. Increases 
in traffic volumes, in light rail, have made the operating environment for rail transit more 
difficult in recent years, leading to increased safety concerns and heightened levels of 
risk. Examples of the types of transportation and land use factors influencing transit 
safety include higher levels of pedestrian and bicycle traffic, increases in population and 
employment density, and various “smart growth” design elements. Previous transit 
industry safety research has provided considerable insights into the effects of human, 
physical and environmental conditions on safety. Recent efforts to examine the influence 
of operating environment on rail accident likelihood have been limited. As a result, the 
relationship between operational characteristics and safety performance of rail transit 
systems is not well understood.  
Following are the objectives set out by the researcher for the present study: 
1) To compare the safety performance of the light rail system and the subway 
system (heavy rail) in USA 
 
2) To examine and discuss the factors causing accidents in both systems 
3) To suggest measures for preventing the occurrence of accidents in both 
light and heavy rail 
The purpose of this study is to examine the safety performance of Light Rail and 
Subway in the U.S. The analysis of this study is designed to offer insights into potential 
operations policies and practices that may be used or changed to improve rail operator 




of operator demographics, factors contributing to operator stress and fatigue, various 
measures of safety risk exposure (e.g., related to time and/or distance, passenger volumes 
served), and route or vehicle characteristics representing potential safety hazards. 
 
1.2 Problem Statement 
Concerns about safety are central to transit system planning and delivery of service. The 
incidence of transit crashes in the US has continued to rise steadily since 2003 and the 
trend does not seem to show any signs of slowing down (FTA, 2009). The consequences 
of injuries, fatalities and property damage resulting from crashes are serious problems 
that continue to affect both the general public and transit agencies in the United States. 
Over the last few years, transit ridership has been at or near 50-year highs primarily due 
to increasing petroleum prices and a renewed focus on environmental sustainability.  
During this time, many transportation service areas have also seen great levels of 
economic development in the form of new housing, employment, and business centers. 
For example, in 2012, the National Transit Database Safety and Security Module have 
recorded more than 4000 collisions, 229 fatalities and more than 9000 injuries in 2011for 
all transit combined (FTA, 2012). The historical trends of total fatality, injury and 






Figure 1.1 Historical trends of transit safety, 2002-2011. 
 
 
In recent years, the choice between light rail and heavy rail has been one of the 
heated topics of debate on transport development, on which the present study focuses. 
The proponents of heavy rail argue that heavy rail is more cost-effective as it carries 
more passengers. According to 2009 estimates of American Public Transportation 
Association (APTA), the subway based heavy rail carried around 3.5 billion trips for 
around 16.8 billion passenger miles (APTA, 2011 Public Transportation Fact Book). In 
contrast, light rail carried passenger on only 465 million trips for 2.2 billion passenger 
miles (APTA, 2011 Public Transportation Fact Book). On the other hand, the supporters 
of light rail system held that it is more costly to build a subway system than to start a 
light rail system as the light rail system can run on existing roadways or cast-off rail 
networks (Garrett 2004). Also, many light rail systems are automated which further 





The most recent FTA report indicates that while ridership has grown annually at a 
relatively steady pace, the rail industry’s accident rate has risen at a greater rate (FTA, 
2009). Similarly, the total value of property damaged in collisions has also continued to 
rise steadily. An analysis of risk management and risk financing practices for a select 
number of transit properties by Chaney and Derr (1996) found that accident losses 
characterized as property damage or bodily injury to passengers, pedestrians or other 
motorists were responsible for about 50% of the total risk cost. Similarly, Abacus 
Technology Corporation (1996) also found that losses related to traffic accidents 
involving collisions and passenger accidents accounted for about 51 percent of the total 
risk cost and, on average, the total risk cost was 4.85 percent of a transit agency’s 
operating expenses. The historical trends of fatality, injury and incident rate for the transit 
systems are increasing as shown in Figure 1.2. The rate is per million PMT for all the 
transit system combined. 
 
 






The rising costs of property in metropolitan cities have forced individuals to 
relocate to the suburbs in order to find greater value in real estate. With the relocation of 
families to the suburbs, more individuals rely on commuter rail or rapid transit as a means 
to commute to work. Empirical data revealed when new transit lines are brought to 
suppressed areas, property value increases (APTA, 2006). A number of other factors may 
influence individuals to consider heavy rail transit as their primary form of transportation.  
Economic factors include the rising cost of parking, major roadwork or repair, 
serving the needs of economically disadvantaged individuals who cannot afford to 
procure a motor vehicle, insurance premiums, and car maintenance. This includes both 
the young and mature populations who do not operate a motor vehicle. As individuals 
continue to move to the suburbs, many come to depend on public transportation due to 
environmental concerns or because they belong to the aging population (APTA, 2006). 
Since many patrons rely on heavy rail transit as their primary form of transportation, the 
transit system needs to function optimally, reliably, and economically. The increase in 
demand requires longer or additional trains for frequent service. Increasing train length or 
frequency of service on any line requires that trains be more reliable to minimize any 
failure during revenue service. The added service translates into higher maintenance costs 
that must be controlled. Maintenance must optimally and efficiently be performed in 
order to minimize failure during revenue service.  
A careful review of data on safety performance of major surface transportation 
modes reveal that US transit systems are relatively safe when compared to automobile 
travel. Given the increasing trend of accident rates, there is a need for transit providers 





toward slowing down and possibly reversing this upward trend. The common approach 
would be to undertake safety investment programs, but the challenge is ascertaining 
where the focus should be and what level of safety resources to allocate.  
Research has indicated that the nature of the accident, the causation and the effect 
vary with respect to the mode of transportation (APTA, 2011 Public Transportation Fact 
Book). Since the rail transit system does not operate on a single mode of transportation, 
safety performance of different types of rails are expected to vary. Light, commuter and 
heavy rails are the three modes of transportation present in the US rail industry. Some 
initial data comparing the number of accidents, the causation factors as well as the 
injuries and economical loss in the accidents of these different modes of rail transit is 
available (FTA, Safety Action Plan 20). However, a more detailed and comprehensive 
inquiry is yet missing. The present study fills this knowledge gap by focusing on the 
safety performance of light rail versus heavy rail. The study not only compares the 
frequency of accidents, injuries and human and financial loss caused by these accidents 
but also looks into the specific factors, with respect to both, within rail systems that cause 
occurrence of these accidents. Furthermore, recommendations for the avoidance of such 
accidents for both rail systems are also made.  
 
1.3 Scope 
The present study is focused on the comparison between safety performances of light rail 
system versus subway system of the USA only. The findings produced in this thesis are 
applicable directly to the rail transit system of USA but important lessons can be learnt 





analyzed in this study is from 2002-2011; and the frequency of incidents and their causes 
are identified for the accidents occurring only within this time period. With the time 
constraint for this thesis, this is the analysis that the author has been used: 
1. Prepare graphs comparing total number of accidents including all types of 
incidents, fatalities, injuries. 
 
2. Determine rate of incidents, fatalities, injuries, suicides and trespassers.  
 
3. Determine rate of accidents/Passenger Miles Traveled (PMT) in millions. 
  
4. Analyze the data, draw conclusion, and make policy recommendations.  
 
1.4 Thesis Structure 
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 presents a review on Light 
Rail and Subway system. This is followed by a complete Literature Review in Chapter 3. 
In Chapter 4 the safety incident frequency analysis are discussed. This is followed with 
results, description and development of the preventability analysis model in Chapter 5. In 
addition, this Chapter also presents and discusses factors that influence the likelihood of 
preventable incident involvement and provides the concluding remarks, highlighting the 





LIGHT RAIL/ SUBWAY SYSTEM 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Rail transit system in USA can be divided into three types with respect to the design and 
capacity. These types include heavy rail, commuter rail and light rail. Heavy rail operates 
through the subway system which is mostly available in big cosmopolitan cities like New 
York City, Boston and Chicago. It operated on completely exclusive guideway, with no 
grade crossings for vehicles or pedestrians.  Systems often support long trains of 6-8 cars, 
and typically have level-platform boarding.  Commonly called "subways" or "rapid rails" 
while Commuter rail operates through rail-road tracks and connects the suburbs to the 
main city centers. On the other hand, light rails can either use main roads as a trolley or 
tram or can have a separate roadway as a multi-car train. It operates on local routes with 
relatively frequent stops, and one or more grade crossings for vehicles or pedestrians.  
Systems often use shorter trains of 2-4 cars, and are typically powered by overhead wires.  
Light Rail includes both streetcars, and rapid light rail systems which may have extensive 
stretches of exclusive guideways, including tunnels/subways (Garrett 2004). 
 
2.2 Background 
The public transportation system in the USA originated in the early 1800s. According to 
Middleton, a famous urban transportation historian, the first public transport system in 
USA consisted of horse-drawn carriages, called omnibuses that started transporting 





as the growing traffic congestion made the ride on these horse stagecoaches a difficult 
one (Iles 2005). To solve this issue a transporter came with the idea of using rails instead 
of streets for moving these horse cars (Middleton 2003). This led to the start of rail-transit 
system in the USA. By the mid-19th century these horse-driven street or rail cars were 
the only public transportation system in the USA (Middleton 2003). According to an 
estimate, in 1880s there were around 400 rail-transit companies in the USA that were 
providing services to around 180 million passengers annually using 6000 miles rail track 
(Garrett 2004). The two other public transit systems that started in USA in the late-1880s 
were cable car and electric streetcars (Garrett 2004)   
Middleton reported that despite this phenomenal development in transit system 
within the USA, the growing population in the main urban centers particularly New York 
City was so high that omnibuses and streetcars failed to meet the public transit 
requirements. In 1867, an entrepreneur Alfred Beach put forward the idea of elevated 
train system in the New York City to resolve the congestion problem (Marten 2010). By 
this time, subways system had already been started in many cities of Europe and inspired 
from this system a number of innovators came up with the different subway’s or elevated 
trains’ models, none of them got much attention or government approval. Later, the same 
Alfred Beach succeeded in starting a pneumatic subway system in New York City but 
again failed to finish it with success due to financial constraints. The attempts continued 
until 1897, when the first electric underground street railway line was spread in the 
Boston area (Marten 2010). In New York City, the elevated train system started in 1870 
while the subway system started operation as late as 1904 (Garrett 2004). Table 2.1 






Table 2.1 Rail-Transit Cities in the USA in 2000 
Cities Population in millions (2000 
estimates)** 
Rail-transit System 
Atlanta 4.11 Heavy 
Baltimore 2.55 Heavy, Light 
Boston* 3.40 Heavy, Light, Commuter 
Charlotte, N.C.* 1.50 Light 
Chicago 8.27 Heavy, Commuter 
Cleveland 2.25 Heavy, Light 
Dallas 3.52 Light 
Denver* 2 .11 Light 
Detroit* 4.44 Light 
Los Angeles 9.52 Heavy, Light, Commuter 
Memphis, Tenn.* 1.14 Light 
Miami 2.25 Heavy, Commuter 
Minneapolis* 2.97 Light 
New Orleans* 1.34 Light 
New York City 9.31 Heavy, Commuter 
Philadelphia* 5 .10 Heavy, Light, Commuter 
Pittsburgh 2.36 Light 
Sacramento, Calif. 1.63 Light 
St. Louis 2.60 Light 
San Diego* 2.81 Light, Commuter 
Seattle* 2.42 Light 
Washington, D.C. 4.92 Heavy, Commuter 
Source: Light Rail Transit Association (www.lrta.org/index.html#top) and city transit web sites, as quoted 
in Garrett 3 
* All or part of the city’s light-rail system consists of streetcars. 







Light rail transit came in the USA a little late. By 1972, North Americans were 
not aware of this term, though some references to this concept have been made in 1960s 
(Thompson 2012). The invention of the automobile in 1910s considerably reduced the 
demand for streetcars in the 20
th
 century and the only choice left for the transporters was 
the heavy rail system. However, that option was much more costly and was not feasible 
for many. A number of articles were published in the late 1990s in favor of transforming 
the street car system with a rapid-transit system but it was not earlier than 1970s that 
practical work started on the developed of light rail system (Thompson 2012). It was also 
1972 when the term “light rail” was coined (Thompson 2012). It was 1981 when the first 
light rail system started operating in the USA in San Diego (Thompson 2012). By now, 
the two rail-transit systems are simultaneously operating in many cities of USA and is a 
popular means of public transportation in these cities. 
 
2.3 Advantages and Disadvantages for Having a Light Rail or Subway in Your City 
The advantages of the light and heavy rail system can be understood well by seeing the 
reasons that caused their advent. As described above, the subway system started in the 
United States much earlier than the start of light-rail system. In the early 1990s, cities like 
New York and Chicago faced serious traffic congestion problem due to the rapidly 
growing population and increasing use of motor vehicles. When it became evident that 
the city roads and streets did not have the capacity to hold the growing traffic, subway 
system was introduced (Middleton 2003). The result was the transfer of traffic load from 





transportation options through the advent of this system but were also be able to reach 
their destination in much less time with no congestion delays and parking issues. 
Light-rail system, however, did not start in the main cities of USA but in the 
suburbs, for the same reason of congestion. The reasons why the authorities did not build 
subway system in those cities were both political and financial. Subway system had been 
in operation since early 1900s but light-rail system made their debut in 1960s. Garrett 
(2004) explained that public at that time was more environmentally conscious and was 
aware of the pollution issues related to heavy rail system. Light rail system could relieve 
not only the congestion issues but also the pollution. In addition, as explained by 
Thompson (2003), development of light-rail system was more economical and thus, more 
suiting for a wider application. 
Marten (2012) has outlined a number of benefits of rapid transit system without 
differentiating between the light and heavy rail system. According to Marten, the rapid 
transit system is an economical option for transportation as the fuel prices are 
continuously increasing. In addition, due to the growing property prices, people cannot 
afford to live in metropolitan cities and are forced to relocate to the suburban areas. These 
relocated people use rapid transit system to go to work. Other important benefits of using 
public transportation are saving of parking and motor maintenance cost, saving of time 
due to congestion and road repairs, and reduction in pollution. He also pointed out that 
the these rapid transit systems offer an excellent transportation option for individuals who 






Litman (2012) conducted a comprehensible study on this subject. He found that 
the cities in which rail transit is the main component of public transportation, the cost of 
congestion per capita is substantially lower than in other cities (Litman 2012). He also 
reported high transit ridership low, traffic death rates, low consumer expenditure on 
transportation and high transit service cost in cities with rail systems as compared to 
cities with none or less-developed rail system. The walking to the station is also found to 
positively affect the health of individuals and cities as cities with established rail system 
have improved individual health status. In terms of cost-efficiency, a number of scholars 
have criticized the rail transit system because it utilizes a large sum from public subsidies 
but Litman held that when considered with the inclusion of congestion cost, parking cost, 
roadway cost, and consumer cost, the rail-transit system appears to be more cost-
efficient.  
However, the main disadvantage of using a rail transit system instead of a private 
automobile is the loss of independence and privacy. Garrett argued that if people are 
willing to pay extra cost on fuel, car registration, maintenance, parking and others, it 
clearly shows that people value their independence and privacy more than the costs 
associated with car ownership. Also, the rail transit system is not much flexible as it 
operates on a defined route and following particular time schedule (Garrett 2005). Also, 
the time spent on walking to the rail station and waiting has been criticized as one big 








2.4 Operating Cost 
The operating cost of a rail transit system in terms of the type of activity or function 
performed includes cost of vehicle operation and maintenance, salaries of car operator 
and other administrative staff and purchase of new vehicles. A comparison of operating 
cost of light and heavy rail by type of function performed is shown in the table 2.2 below, 
 
  Table 2.2 Operating Costs of Heavy and Light Rails by Type of Activity Performed 
Type of Operating Expense Heavy Rail Light Rail 
Vehicle Operation 2775.7 549.7 
Vehicle Maintenance 1133.2 260.5 
Non-vehicle Maintenance 1552.0 221.4 
General Administration 788.5 266.9 
Purchased Transportation 61.2 111.4 
Total 6310.5 1409.9 
  Source: APTA, 2011 Public Transportation Fact Book 21 
 All costs are in millions of dollar 
 
 
In terms of the type of goods and services performed, the operating cost includes 
salaries, fringe benefits, cost of services, cost of materials and supplies, and others. 
According to Garrett the salaries account for the highest operating cost in the light rail 
system. APTA (2011 Public Transportation Fact Book) also reported the same results that 
the salaries and other incentives for employees of transit agencies account for around 






Table 2.3 Operating Costs of Heavy and Light Rails by Type of Goods or Service 
Purchased 
Type of Operating Expense Heavy Rail Light Rail 
Salaries and Wages 3160.5 528.7 
Fringe Benefits 2467.4 361.2 
Services 363.9 196.1 
Materials and Supplies 421.7 91.1 
Utilities 580.5 100.8 
Casualty and Liability 128.3 22.9 
Purchased transportation 61.2 111.4 
Other -873.1 -2.2 
Total 6310.5 1409.9 
Source: APTA, 2011 Public Transportation Fact Book21 
 All costs are in millions of dollar 
 
The revenue to cover this operation cost comes either from the passenger fares or 
from the federal or local government funding. Garrett held that most of the operating cost 
is covered through public tax and only 30% of the revenue is generated by the fares. 
(APTA 2011 Public Transportation Fact Book) reported the figure of 37% which is 
almost same. The 2009 estimates of annual passenger fares for heavy rail were $3,801 
million and for light rail were $390.6 million (APTA, 2011 Public Transportation Fact 
Book). Therefore, on average, passenger fare covers around 60% of operating cost in 
heavy rail and only 27% in light rail system. Thus, light-rail system appears to be less 





The operating cost of a rail system depends considerably on the size of system 
and the area of operation and consequently there are marked differences in the operating 
costs of different rail systems of USA. A better approach to use operating cost as a 
measure of efficiency is to compare the operating cost per passenger or per vehicle mile.  
Table 2.4 below compares the efficiency of the heavy and light rail system using this 
approach. 
Table 2.4 Cost-Efficiency of Light Rail and Heavy Rail 
 Light Rail Heavy Rail 
Operating Cost 6310.5 1409.9 
Passenger Miles 16,805 2,199 
Vehicle Miles 684.6 90.7 
Operating Cost per Passenger 
Miles 
0.38 0.64 
Operating Cost per Vehicle Miles 9.22 15.54 
 APTA’s 2011 Public Transportation Fact Book 
 
2.5 Transit Safety Management and Safety Performance Measurement 
According to the report of National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), one important 
cause of rail accidents is the limitation in the safety management system of rail agencies 
(GAO 2011). The important limitations in the safety management system, identified in 
the report, were problems in the safety rule and procedure defined by the transit agencies 
and the inadequacy of proper system to ensure that the defined rules and procedures are 
followed by the employees. For instance, in one incidence it was found that the agency’ 





one employee while working on a track (GAO 2011). Similarly, in another incidence, it 
was found that the train operator failed to follow the controlling signal indication as he 
was napping at that moment (GAO 2011).  
FTA has recently taken action to ensure the development of effective safety 
management system in all urban transit agencies. In 2006, FTA prepared a Rail Transit 
Safety Action Plan with the purpose to identify the most common causes of rail transit 
accidents and to find ways to deal with these common causes (Safety Action Plan 3). 
Analysis of rail accidents that occurred from 2005 to 2005 showed that the most common 
type of accidents was collisions, of which the most common category was the collision of 
rail with the motor vehicle at rail grade crossing (FTA 2006). It was found that of the 371 
total accidents, the probable cause of 225 accidents was not identifiable due to the lack of 
information (FTA, 2006 Safety Action Plan 20). This clearly shows the weakness in the 
accident reporting and data management system of transit agencies.  
Different causes were identified for the collision accidents in light rail and heavy 
rail. In light rail collision, most common cause was the “illegal, inappropriate or risky 
actions” of motor vehicle’s driver and pedestrians. Although, for around 12% of incidents 
the rail operator was found responsible while for 5% cases there was clear violation of 
operating rules. In heavy rail collisions, the violation of operating rules was more 
frequent and most of the collisions occurred due to this factor. Operator fatigue and 
inattentiveness was found to cause five of the 36 heavy rail collisions. Violation of 
operating rules and procedures was also found to cause derailments and rail fires.  
Based on these finding FTA proposed a plan in which the first priority was given 





are listed in Table 2.5). For reduction of collision, FTA planned to improve the rail grade 
crossing and to use research finding of FTA and other agencies for improving the safety 
of pedestrians and trespassers. As incompliance with operating rules was found to be an 
important cause, FTA revised the State Safety Oversight rule to ensure that all rail transit 
agencies integrate the compliance with operating and maintenance rules in their 
respective System Safety Program Plans (FTA, Safety Action Plan 41).  
APTA has also taken steps for the establishment of effective safety management 
system for the urban rail transit industry of USA. It has recently published a Manual as a 
guidebook for the development of effective safety management system for urban rail 
transit. The objective of this manual is not only to assist the transit agencies that are 
member of APTA in developing their safety management system but it also defines the 
criteria for the APTA safety management audit program.  
According to this manual, the first step for the development of safety management 
system is to fulfill the administrative requirements for safety management that include 
planning a specific course of action for safety management process and timely review of 
the process to ensure that the safety goals are being met (APTA, Manual for Urban 
Transit Safety Management System Section 3.0). APTA held that in this initial phase of 
planning and organization for safety management system, the rail transit agency should 
give explicit information about the operational structure of urban rail system along with 
its specific safety requirements, an approved and attested safety policy statement, identify 
the administrative body having authority to manage and monitor the safety management 
system, define goals and objectives for safety management, and develop a strategic plan 





The second phase of safety management system development, according to 
APTA’s Manual for Urban Transit Safety Management System (Section 4.0), is the 
implementation of the safety program. One important element of this implementation 
process is the maintenance of rail infrastructure by assuring the access and availability of 
safety-related equipment and frequent inspection of equipment to report the defective or 
missing items. The inspection and repair of the vehicle is another important feature for 
assuring the safety of the transit system. The operating and administrative staff should be 
trained for safety management and the safety policies should be reviewed on regular 
basis. The safety management program should include an emergency management 
program as well as a workplace safety program. For contracted service, there should be 
safety-related clauses in the contract. In addition the rail transit agencies should also take 
measure for assuring the safety of passengers and trespassers. APTA Manual also held 
that the safety of operating rail corridor is the most important element of safety 
management program due to the increasing number of accidents on rail grade crossing 
and of roadway workers and trespassers. The manual also proposed measures for 
prevention of suicide accidents. Furthermore, APTA also consider the recent issues of 
environmental safety and sustainable development to be important and held that the rail 
transit agencies should be held accountable for the environmental impacts of their transit 
operations (Section 4.0). 
The third and very important section of safety management system is related to 
the engineering practices and analysis (APTA, Manual for Urban Transit Safety 
Management System Section 5.0). The identification of system risk, their measurement 





considerations. APTA identified five important elements related to engineering technique 
and analysis namely, risk reduction, hazard management, accident reporting and 
investigation system, reliable data collection and authentic analysis, and loss prevention 
and control mechanism including the analysis of fire safety and causality management 
(Section 5.0).  
The last important area that ought to be covered by the safety management system 
of the rail transit agency is the safety assurance by adoption of change management and 
performance measurement systems (APTA, Manual for Urban Transit Safety 
Management System Section 6.0). APTA suggested the use of configuration management 
for analyzing the impact of change along with reference to FTA safety standards, regular 
inspection and timely system modification, and use of existing quality control program 
for safety assurance. Transit agencies should also obtain certification for their security 
management systems from FTA and should also review the safety performance in case of 
any system modification. There should also be a proper document management system in 
the rail transit agencies. Most importantly, the transit agencies should adopt a reliable 
safety performance measurement system including both internal and external audit 







In order to have an understanding of transportation safety performance, performance 
management, as well as our choice for case study, series of literature reports analyzed and 
provided a great deal of information needed to begin building our comparative analysis.  
A detailed literature search revealed uneven coverage on the safety performance 
measures and research. That is, there are a large number of research papers, data sources, 
and methodologies for highway safety /crash analyses but very limited research and data 
sources for transit safety performance measures. 
 
3.1 Public Transportation Ridership Trends 
Heavy rail transit systems have grown in popularity for several reasons (APTA, 2006). 
Patrons rely on public railway transit systems primarily because of the increasingly high 
cost of automobile fuel, traffic congestion, escalating property costs, and environmental 
concerns, as well as the systems’ convenience and efficiency (APTA, 2006; Capital 
Corridor, 2007; Celik & Yankaya, 2006). The public transportation ridership trend 
illustrated in Figure 1 clearly illustrates the trends and importance of transit to the United 
States since the early 1900s (APTA, 2006). 
According to APTA (2006), various social and economic factors have affected the 
popularity of public transportation. In the beginning of the 20th century, ridership grew at 





(APTA), which was directly attributed to the loss of jobs and lack of money. The patron 
ridership increased again during World War II, when public transport became the main 
mode of transportation in many urban areas. Ridership peaked in 1946 with more than 
23.4 billion trips reported on trains, buses, and trolleys. 
 
3.2 The Conceptual / Theoretical Frameworks 
Human capital theory has empirically been tested and supported by a number of rail 
industry safety studies (Rodriguez et al. 2006; Rodriguez et al. 2003; Monaco and 
Williams, 2000). For example, Rodriguez et al. (2003) found that human capital, 
occupational and compensation factors were important predictors of crash frequencies.  
A careful review of empirical studies in the large area of safety reveals that 
application of human capital theory has been used in rail industry safety analysis only to 
a limited scale. In general, there seems to be no consensus on one unified theory of 
accident occurrences. However, it is also evident that the traditional subway–based 
empirical framework has most often been adapted and applied to rail transit safety 
research at both industry and firm levels.  
The conventional subway-based empirical approach treats occurrences of subway 
or commercial vehicle accidents as being the result of the interaction between the driver, 
vehicle, and environmental conditions (Jovanis, 1989; Jovanis, 1986). Evidence suggests 
that empirical studies that have used this approach have had a driver focus, in part 
because human error is recognized as the key determinant of commercial vehicle 





directly be applied to rail transit accident analysis because of the complications that are 
inherent and specific in the transit industry.  
There are features which are unique to rail transit and have no parallel structure in 
the traditional subway safety field. First, there is the risk of an accident in rail transit 
which is affected in part by transit service characteristics and by agency policy 
environment in addition to the traditional factors of human, vehicle, subway and 
environmental conditions, such as, weather and lighting factors. Second, passenger 
injuries resulting from non-collision incidents are also a major concern in the transit 
industry. In particular, injuries to transit passengers occur in non-collision incidents, 
especially while the vehicle is accelerating or decelerating (Wahlberg, 2007), and during 
boarding and alighting processes (Morlok et al., 2004; Hudenski, 1992).  
Prior research on rail safety performance has mainly been examined at two-levels 
of analysis; system and route–levels. The system level approach is used where the goal of 
the analysis is to investigate factors that are important in safety and to provide broad level 
indicators of safety performance (Chang and Yeh, 2005; Jovanis et al. 1991). Beyond the 
big picture or safety performance indicators, route level designs are used in determining 
geometric and other non-behavioral factors that contribute to crash incidents (Jovanis et 
al. 1991; Chimba et al. 2010). Data in route-level design are organized around the 
individual routes or network facility segments. As observed in the studies by Jovanis et 
al. and Chimba et al., the route-based design approach is limited to the sample of 
operators who are involved in incidents and consequently, information on those without 






 In contrast to earlier safety research, the present study examines the contributing 
factors to rail safety using the operator signup based approach. This approach is 
consistent with Evans (2004) perspective that efforts to improve safety should focus on 
human behavior. Similarly, FTA (2009) policy paper on rail safety improvement 
strategies recommends that the focus should be to identify and assess effects of factors 
that are within transit agency control.  
 
3.3 Urban Transportation in America 
The history of rapid transit began with the first transit system, which consisted of 
stagecoaches pulled by horses. Over time, horses were replaced with other motive 
sources such as pneumatic, steam, cable, and electricity. Middleton (2003), a rapid transit 
historian, reported that the first urban transit system in North America appeared in New 
York City in 1827, consisting of horse-drawn stagecoaches.  
By 1832, the New York City stagecoaches were replaced by horse-drawn 
streetcars. The congestion on the street from the horse-drawn streetcars, pedestrians, and 
private stagecoaches, became a concern for the growing city (IIes, 2005). Middleton 
reported that an innovator named Alfred Beach, in 1867, proposed to resolve the 
congestion problem on New York City streets with a pneumatic subway, which he 
subsequently designed and built. His pneumatic subway used air to power the trains 
under street level, avoiding the use of conventional steam engines. Beach’s innovation 
used 10-foot fans located at each end of the subway to propel the train along the subway 
line. Middleton (2003) went on to report that in 1866, William Hemstreet built a transit 





railway transit system operated for the next two decades. Middleton posited that since the 
introduction and subsequent abandonment of the pneumatic subway in 1870, other 
innovators proposed, designed, and built different configurations of railway transit 
systems.  
Since the 1900s, several transit designs have used subway, elevated tracks, and at-
grade guide ways. Designs incorporated pneumatic, steam, complex cable, and electricity 
to propel the trains. While each of the propulsion systems offer advantages and 
disadvantages, pneumatic and steam solutions have been largely abandoned, while cable 
remains suitable for limited situations.  
Since the introduction of Beach’s rapid transit system, many forms of 
underground (e.g., subway) and elevated railway transit systems have been constructed. 
After 1900, railway rapid transit increased in popularity and eventually replaced the 
horse- and mule-drawn carriages. 
 
3.4 The Empirical Findings 
Turning to the specific factors and how they are related to accident rates and frequencies, 
evidence is clear that numerous factors play roles in accident occurrences. These factors 
have been well identified in the empirical framework conceptualized by Jovanis et al. 
(1991) and they are consistent with the human capital theoretical framework (Rodriguez 
et al. 2003; Monaco and Williams, 2000). 
In general, traffic safety literature has found negligent driver behavior to be the 
principal cause of crashes. Evans (2004), for example, summarizes the findings of two 





thousands of crash records, both studies found driver behavior to be either the sole or 
contributing cause of over 90% of crashes. The principal causes of the remaining crashes 
were identified as vehicle failures (e.g., brakes and tires), environmental factors (e.g, 
weather and lighting), and roadway factors (e.g., design and condition).  
 
3.5 Safety Culture in Rail Transit System 
Rail transit system is relatively safer than travelling through other modes of transport 
(Nelson and Streit 2011). Statistics shows the probability of accident in motor vehicles is 
much higher than the probability of in rail (Bureau of Transportation Statistics 2011). In 
2009, some 5,505,000 accidents occur on the road while 3,807 accidents occur on the 
railroad (Bureau of Transportation Statistics 2011). However, the loss of life and property 
in the recent rail incidents has called for the need to make necessary action so this loss 
can be avoided in future. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has conducted 
investigation on these accidents and has outlined a number of factors that contributed to 
these rail accidents (Government Accountability Office 2011).  
One important contributing factor, mentioned by the NTSB, is the lack of safety 
culture in the transit agencies, which according to Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) is a “challenge that largest transit agencies face”. One very basic problem 
regarding the establishment of safety culture in the rail transit agencies is that there is no 
universally accepted definition of safety culture. Reason has explained that the literature 
on safety culture has defined it usually in two ways: “as something an organization is (the 
beliefs, attitudes and values of its members regarding the pursuit of safety), and as 





designed to enhance safety).” Thus, safety culture is a combination of the organizational 
values, policies and practices regarding the establishment of safety. In the APTA Manual 
for Urban Rail Safety Management System, safety culture has been defined as: 
“The product of individual and group values, attitudes, perceptions, competencies, 
and patterns of behavior that can determine the commitment to and the style and 
proficiency of an organization’s Safety Management System” (APTA, 2011 Manual for 
Urban Transit Safety Management System). 
The safety culture has been reported to vary in different rail transit agencies 
(GAO 2011). However, all in all, the degree of safety culture in transit agencies is 
considered as low and there is need to bring changes in the behavior and commitment of 
employees as well as values and culture of organization to develop the safety culture in 
the rail transit industry as a whole (GAO 2011). APTA has recently set the development 
of safety culture in the urban rail transit agencies to be one of its prime goals (APTA, 
2011 Manual for Urban Transit Safety Management System).  
One important element of the safety culture that has been found missing in the rail 
transit system of USA is the reporting culture, which is claimed by Reason (1998) to be 
the most difficult to achieve. In a report by Federal Railroad Administration (FRA 2005), 
it was found that among the 543 reportable grade crossing accidents that occurred from 
May 2003 to December 2004 and caused 116 fatalities, only 115 (21%) were 
immediately reported. The delay in the required immediate reporting to FRA resulted in 
the difficulty for FRA to decide whether or not to conduct investigation on that accident.  
Reason (1998) identified that the main reason for the lack of reporting culture is 





own mistakes. Thus, when FRA (2005) investigated the issue, it was found that in many 
cases employees were actually confused due to the unclear regulation regarding the 
reporting of rail road accidents. It was noted that most of such unreported cases involved 
fatalities of non-passengers. As per FRA regulation, railroads are not required to 
immediately inform FRA about the occurrence of accidents that involves injury of non-
passengers. However, if any of the non-passengers died after accidents, they are required 
to report the matter immediately. They noted that in many cases the non-passengers died 
when they had been taken from the accident scene to the hospital and as a result, railroad, 
unaware of the fatality, did not report the accident immediately (FRA 2005). 
The different measures suggested by FTA officials for improvement of safety 
culture are giving proper safety training to staff, evaluation of the current status of safety 
management system, and reliable and valid measurement of safety performance (GAO 
2011). According to APTA, development of safety culture in an organization can be 
achieved through three stages 
1. “Stage 1:  Safety is based on rules and regulations. 
2. Stage 2:  Safety is considered as an organizational goal. 
3. Stage 3:  Safety can always be improved” (Manual for Urban Transit 
Safety Management System Sec 3.3.2) 
 
To find out at which stage of safety culture development a transit agency is at 
present, multiple methods, including employee surveys and interviews, focus group 
discussion, observation of the process employed for handling of conflicts and focus on 
the safety defense, should be used (APTA, 2011 Manual for Urban Transit Safety 





3.6 Factors beyond Transit Management Control 
Turning to factors specifically related to design and other related conditions, there is clear 
evidence indicating that the effect of these factors on crash activity depends in part on the 
type of the variable and how the given variable is entered in the estimation model. 
Railway segments or zones with higher average posted speed limits are consistently 
associated with fewer accident occurrences (Jovanis et al. 1991 ). 
This relationship is, however, counter-intuitive and has been explained in various 
ways. Some authors have argued that high speed railway tracks are likely to be well 
designed, carry small traffic volumes and have fewer stations and are therefore relatively 
safer ( Jovanis et al. 1991). The challenge is that such routes allowing faster travel may 
be safer but might not be preferred for transit operations if fewer patrons exist. 
Alternatively, higher speed limit may mean lower spacing between intersections and thus 
less opportunity for conflicts.  
Shoulder width and travel lane width have mixed effects on accident occurrence. 
The effect and magnitude of each of these variables depend on whether the factor is 
entered in the estimation model as a continuous or as a dummy variable. For example, 
Shankar et al. (1997) showed that when defined as categorical or dummy variables, travel 







In the organizational safety literature, human factors are widely studied using 
psychology and engineering perspective. However, in some recent studies, this human 
factors approach has been adopted to study the public safety issues with regard to road 
and rail traffic accidents (Baysari et al. 2009; Greig & Hopkins 2011; Petridou & 
Moustaki 2000). 
With regard to the road accidents, a recent study was conducted in Britain in 
which it was highlighted that human factors such as drivers’ or passengers’ human errors 
play a vital role in the occurrence of road accidents (Greig & Hopkins 2011). The study 
further found that the age of driver is significantly associated with certain factors that 
cause these accidents (Greig & Hopkins 2011). After reviewing the studies on human 
factors association with traffic accidents, Petridou & Moustaki reached the conclusion 
that in Europe around 90% of traffic accidents are caused by human factors. 
In the research related to rail accident, there was little attention to these human 
factors. It is just few years back when researcher started realizing the importance of these 
factors and inspired from the convincing findings of studies on other modes of transport, 
conduct studies on finding rail human factors (Wilson & Norris 2006). One important 
area of research with regard to human factors in rail accident causation is on the rail 
operator’s behavior. Baysari (2009) adopted the human factors approach to analyze 19 
rail accidents in Australia and found that the main human factor related to these accidents 
was the “slip of attention of rail operators.” Driver’s lacks of motivation or fatigue due to 
over workload or low compensation are also highlighted in a number of studies (Cotteril 
& Jones 2005; Gouin et al. 2006). Ashton and Fowler (203) suggested using human 





believed that the  one important way to reduce the driver error is by giving attention to 
the details of driving job like wage, workload, job aids etc. They held that the workload 
on the rail drivers should be kept at a moderate level as high or low workload can 
increase the probability of driver error.  
Petridou & Moustaki (2000) have classified the human factors related to drivers 
into two main branches, first the factor that affect the driving ability of the driver and 
second the factors that led to risky and careless behavior of the driver. They further 
divided these two types of factors with respect to the long-term and short-term impact. 
According to their review, the factors that produce long term impact on the drivers’ 
ability to drive safely include their lack of experience, old age, any disability or disease, 
accident proneness, and alcoholism and drug abuse (Petridou & Moustaki 2000). The 
factors that produce short-term or temporary impact on driving ability are fatigue, high 
alcohol intoxication, temporary drug effects, overeating, acute psychological stress, and 
temporary distraction ( Petridou & Moustaki 2000). Similarly, overconfidence on driving 
abilities, habit of over-speeding, law-breaking habit, indecent driving attitude, wrong 
sitting posture while driving, disuse of seat belt or helmet, accident proneness and 
alcoholism are factor that produce long-term impact on risk-taking behavior of driver 
while moderate intake of ethanol, intake of psychotropic drugs, motor vehicle crimes, 
attraction to suicide and other compulsive acts are responsible for short-term risky 
behavior of drivers (Petridou & Moustaki 2000).  
Another important area of research is related to the response of driver to the 
danger signals. Studies have attempted to find better signals system to grab attention of 





(Collis & Schmid 2001; Pasquini et al.2004). Tools have also been developed to identify 
the risk of accidents due to the single passing at danger (SPADs) (Holywell 2005; Lowe 
& Turner 2005). 
With the improvement of technology used in the rail operation, the nature of rail 
human factors will be changed. Moreover, as identified by Wilson and Norris, there is 
growing centralization in the rail functions which will also influence the role of drivers 
and their responsibilities. Another important change that has been witnessed in past few 
years is the increase in ridership (APTA, 2011 Public Transportation Fact Book 10) 
because of which rail transit agencies want to increase the number of rails (Wilson & 
Norris 2006). With the increase in the rail number the information about their route and 
time schedule will become more complex and research will have to examine the human 
factors associated with management of complex and large amount of information. 
 
 
3.7 Need for Safety Performance Measurement 
GAO reported that the main reason why transit agencies are facing difficultly in 
developing safety culture is their inability to measure the safety performance of their 
agency. The safety performance data collected by them and the analysis conducted by 
them is often flawed which make it difficult to identify the main causes of safety hazards 
(GAO 2011). The report mentioned that the data present in the FTA’s Safety Database is 
not reliable as there are unsubstantiated figures, repeated entries, entries that were not 





The report clearly highlighted the importance of having an effective and reliable 
safety performance measurement system as without it, it is difficult for FTA to decide the 
level of improvement in the agencies as well as to identify and curtail the issues that can 
breach the safety measures (GAO 2011). Safety performance can also enable FTA to set 
specific safety performance goals for the rail transit agencies and make informed decision 
for reducing the rail accidents in future (GAO 2011).  
APTA also consider safety performance measurement to be an important factor 
and have defined the phase of safety performance measure and assessment to be one of 
the main stages for the development of safety management system suggested by them for 
the urban rail transit agencies (Manual for Urban Transit Safety Management System 
Section 2.2.3). The report held that safety performance measurement help in 
benchmarking the safety performance of rail transit agencies and in identifying the 
pattern and level of progress of different rail transit agencies.  
 
3.8 Summary 
The literature review also reveals a number of limitations to prior studies on rail 
transit accident analysis. First, there are no studies that have comprehensively examined 
the operational determinants of rail transit accidents at the operator signup level. Second, 
the influence of employment status, assigned work, work performance abilities and 
customer feedback on the expected frequencies of bus collision and non-collision has not 







from Transit ITS technologies and related systems to develop an operator-based safety 
incident model that can help in identifying and assessing the effect of factors that 
contribute to the likelihood of preventable incident involvement and occurrence of transit 
bus safety incidents. 
The findings from the empirical literature review reveal that prior empirical 
studies specifically examining rail crashes primarily addressed the effects of operator 
demographics, factors contributing to operator stress and fatigue, various measures of 
safety risk exposure and route or vehicle characteristics representing potential safety 
hazards. The importance of operational characteristics has also been recognized by 
researchers (Jovanis et al., 1991). Due to data limitations and research design issues, 
these studies could not directly model the likelihood of preventable incident involvement 








4.1 Transit Safety Data Sources 
The primary data source for this paper is from National Transit Database (NTD) report. 
NTD is the Federal Transit Administration's primary national database for statistics on 
the transit industry (National Transit Database, 2011). It was established by Congress to 
be the nation’s primary source for information and statistics on the transit system of the 
United State. Basically, our data includes operating information of number of vehicles, 
passenger miles traveled, vehicle revenue miles, vehicle revenue hours and incidents 
information on total incidents, total fatalities and injuries, etc. The database provides us 
information from 2002 to 2011 which include all kinds of transportation modes in the 
US. For this research purpose, Subway and Light Rail’s data has been used for the entire 
United State. 
According to National Transit Database, there are some limitations that need to 
consider before using the data. Data quality and completeness have improved 
significantly over time. The safety & security data collection was introduced as a pilot 
program in 2002. Over time, most transit properties developed new internal data 
collection and processing methods to meet the new requirements. These developments, 
combined with the implementation of more sophisticated validation checks by FTA, have 





These data have created an opportunity to explore a new dimension of safety- the transit 
operating environment. Previous research could not systematically and comprehensively 
address this dimension due to data limitations and research design complications. 
After the close of a month, transit properties have one month to compile and 
submit data to the NTD. Upon submission, NTD Analysts review submissions for data 
completeness and reasonableness and request revisions where appropriate.  To allow for 
this validation process, this Time Series includes a 90 day lag before publishing reported 
safety and security data.  Therefore, January data is not published until the May release of 
the Safety & Security Time Series File.  Additionally, transit properties may revise their 
data at any time during the calendar year reporting cycle, which lasts through March 1 of 
the subsequent year. These changes may be done unilaterally by the transit property, as 
the transit property collects additional data on its operations and these changes will be 
reflected in subsequent release of the Safety & Security Time Series. 
This Time Series includes service data collected through the NTD Annual 
Module.  Because closeout of the Annual Module occurs after closeout for the Safety & 
Security Module, the Time Series file may incorporate the previous years’ service data 
for 1 or 2 of the most current Time Series data sheets.  The Time Series data sheets will 
include a notation if such an adjustment has been made. 
A transit agency that directly operates some of its motorbus service and contracts 
out for the rest of its motorbus service will have two separate lines for motorbus service, 
one for the directly operated component and another for the purchased transportation 
component. The same principle holds true for a transit agency that contracts out its 





lines, depending on whether it was directly operated or purchased transportation.  
 
4.2 Safety Management Information Statistics Database (SMIS) 
Transit agencies have been collecting safety‐related data for more than three decades. 
Over 750 of the nation’s public transportation providers submit safety data to the 
National Transit Database (NTD) program routinely by service mode These data are used 
by the FTA to construct metrics and track trends of the overall safety performance of the 
transit industry (FTA, 2012).  
The quality and completeness of accident/incident data reported by transit 
agencies affect the understanding of the safety of the U.S. transit industry and 
consequently how safety resources are targeted. The reported data usually come from 
accident, incident, or police reports and are used to complete the major incident report 
form (S&S‐40) and the non‐major incident summary report form (S&S‐50) required by 
the FTA. The information contained in these forms is entered into the National Transit 
Database (NTD), which also contains financial and operating data for public 
transportation systems in the U.S.  
The NTD underwent a major redesign for calendar year 2002 (FTA, 2005). The 
NTD now incorporates a web-based, monthly, and two-tiered safety and security incident 
collection mechanism. The injury definition was changed for the 2002 revision of the 
NTD to coincide with other USDOT modes. A redesign of the NTD for calendar year 
2002 resulted in the Federal Railroad Administration’s (FRA) Rail Accident/Incident 





For NTD electronic reporting purposes, transit operators collect data on four major 
categories of transit accidents:  
1. collisions,  
2. derailments/buses going off the road,  
3. personal casualties, and  
4. fires.  
These major categories are divided into subcategories. For example, the collisions 
category comprises collisions with vehicles, objects, and people except suicides. Transit 
agencies report fatalities, injuries, accidents, incidents, and property damage in excess of 
a specified dollar amount. 
 
4.3 State Safety Oversight Agency Data 
In response to Congressional concern regarding the potential for accidents and incidents 
on rail transit systems, the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 
(ISTEA) added Section 28 to the Federal Transit Act, codified at 49 U.S.C. Section 5330. 
This section requires the FTA to issue a regulation creating the first state-managed 
oversight program for rail transit safety. 
State Safety Oversight Agency (SSO) agencies are required to submit data 
annually to the FTA on transit accident and hazard investigations including date, type of 
accident, number of injuries, number of fatalities, probable cause, property damage, and 
type of individuals injured, such as passenger or worker. These annual data submissions 





recommends, but does not require, SSO agencies to provide internal tracking numbers 
assigned to each accident; not all SSO agencies do so. 
To allow for the individuality of reporting agencies, the FTA allows each agency 
to develop its own reporting format, including items such as accident cause 
classifications. Some agencies have indicated that they would prefer to report using a 
standardized form. In response, the FTA has developed the SSO Annual Reporting 
Template, which is fully acceptable for Annual Certification and may help streamline the 
process. 
In addition to the two primary sources, other entities, such as departments of 
public safety, police departments, city/county/state transportation and traffic departments, 
and universities, may also provide some of the necessary data. For instance, local public 
works departments and state departments of transportation are good sources of traffic 
data (traffic volumes, traffic speeds, inventories of traffic control devices, traffic signal 
timing information, and so forth). The geographic information systems (GIS) maintained 
by local planning organizations can be very helpful in analyzing data spatially. 
 
4.4  Comparative Analysis 
The total number of incidents, injuries and fatalities for Subway (HR) and Light rail (LR) 
from 2002 to 2011 are included in historical trends for subway and light rail below. 4.1 
show the incident data comparison between Subway and light rail. From 2002 to 2008, 
incidents related to Light Rail are of much larger amount than incidents related to 
Subway; however, incidents from Subway from 2009 to 2011 has been increase to the 





these 10 years is 312 per year. However, the average amount of incidents related to 
Subway is 239 per year.  
Figure 4.2 illustrates the difference in injuries from Subway and Light Rail from 
2002 to 2011.  Total injuries data shows that Light Rail had caused far more injuries than 
Subway, with around 274 a year compared to around 232 a year for Subway. From 2007 
to 20011, the injuries caused by Light Rail and Subway increase and the injuries caused 
by Subway is almost double the one caused by Light Rail from 2020 to 2011. 
Figure 4.3 analyzes how the fatalities caused by Subway are related to Light Rail. 
Total fatalities caused by Subway are far greater than fatalities caused by Light Rail. For 
light rail, the average of fatalities during these 10 years is 20 per year, but the average 
amount of fatalities related to Subway is 59 per year.  
 








Figure 4.2 Total injuries from 2002 to 2011 for light rail and subway. 
 
 
Figure 4.3 Total fatalities from 2002 to 2011 for light rail and subway. 
 
 
The operating statistics of each mode shows total passenger miles traveled (PMT), 
total vehicle revenue miles (VRM) and total vehicle revenue hours (VRH) for each mode 
respectively. The author can conclude from these figures that from 2002 to 2011, 
numbers for each category have increased. On the other hand, for the three factors above, 





15,019,416,633 and 1,857,140,694 for Light Rail; the average VRM per year for Subway 
is 89 Million and 44 Million for Light Rail; and the average VRH per year for Subway is 
15 Million and 4 Million for Light Rail. According national transit database (NTD), the 
data used to count the VRH as train (train revenue hours) prior to 2008 (all vehicles in 
one train), but after 2008, NTD started to count it as vehicle revenue hours. Each train 
has in average 8 vehicles so that is why after 2008 the VRH is so high. Despite the much 
safer performance, public transit has not been cast in a positive light when it comes to 
safety measures (see Figures 4.4 to 4.6). One simple explanation is that VRM is not the 
proper conversion to measure safety performance for all modes. One transit vehicle may 
carry 20 to 100 riders while the average occupancy rate for private vehicles in the US is 
less than two (2). The Passenger Miles Traveled (PMT) may be a better conversion unit 
but not all modes collect such data. For example, the metrics collected by the official 
source, Bureau of Transportation Statistics, US Department of Transportation, measure 
the fatality rate for air travel per 100 million aircraft miles, for waterborne mode 
numbered boats and train miles for railroad mode.  
 







Figure 4.5 Total revenue miles traveled by each mode between 2002 and 2011. 
 
 
Figure 4.6 Total vehicle revenue hours by each mode between 2002 and 2011. 
 
 
It is clear that when compared to other modes, particularly automobiles, the safety 
performance of public transportation is often distorted due to inadequate unit conversions 
or calculation bases. This arises, in part, because of the differences in how safety 
performance is defined and measured among transportation modes and because of the 





some of the comparisons of aggregate national safety statistics and performance measures 
of different transportation modes can be misleading and may, in fact, distort the safety 
performance record of a particular mode.  
The disparity between the safety performance and public perceptions of various 
transportation modes may have hampered the viability of transit services. Given the 
discrepancies and misperceptions of existing safety performance measures, the public 
transit industry is in urgent need of recognizing, addressing, and improving a safety 
performance comparison among transportation modes.  
Transit incidents, fatalities and injuries vary considerable from year to year, 
especially when viewed alone, without consideration to the volume of ridership. Figure 
4.7 shows the incidents rate per million passenger miles traveled; we figure out that from 
2003 to 2005 there was an increase in the incident rate for Light Rail; thus, it was 
decreased from 2005 to 2006. From 2007 to 2011, the incident rate for Light Rail 
increased. The incidents rate for Subway was relatively low, but started to increase in 
2008. 
The true pictures of transit safety for various modes start to emerge when the 
simple accident or fatality numbers are converted into various operating contexts. For 
example in Figure 4.8, the injuries rate per million PMT for Light Rail is much higher 
than the rate for Subway. From 2003 to 2005, the injury rate increased for Light Rail; the 
rate started to decrease between 2005 and 2006. However, the injury rate started to 
increase after 2006 and now passengers have the highest rate of getting injured ever 





down almost every year until 2007 where it started to increase every year but at a lower 
rate than the Light Rail.  
As shown in Figure 4.9, the fatality rate per PMT for Light Rail is higher than the 
Subway. From 2002 to 2004, there were an increase in passenger fatality rate for Light 
Rail but started to decrease from 2004 to 2006. Since 2006, the fatality rate went up and 
down but at a higher rate than the previous year. From 2004 to 2006, the fatality rate for 
subway decreased, but it started to increase in 2007.  
 
 







Figure 4.8 Total injury rate for subway and light rail from 2002 to 2011. 
 
 
Figure 4.9 Total fatality rate for subway and light rail from 2002 to 2011. 
 
            For figure 4.10, the passenger injuries rate per million PMT for Light Rail is 
much higher than the rate for Subway. From 2003 to 2005, the passenger injury rate 
increased for Light Rail; the rate started to decrease between 2005 and 2006. However, 
the passenger injury rate started to increase after 2006, and now passengers have the 
highest rate of getting injured ever before. For the Subway, the injury rate was almost 





          For Figure 4.11, the passenger fatality rate per PMT for Light Rail is higher than 
the Subway. From 2003 to 2006, there were a big jump the in passenger fatality rate for 
Light Rail but come to be lower than Subway after 2006 and stay lower until 2011. It 
means that from 2006 to 2011, passengers had higher risk of getting killed by the Subway 
than the Light Rail; however, the average passenger fatality rate per Million PMT per 
year for Light Rail was 0.0004 while the average rate for Subway was 0.0003 per year.  
 
 















Figure 4.11 Total passenger fatality rate for subway and light rail from 2002 to 2011. 
 
The Suicide rate plays a big part of the fatalities for the Subway system. For over 
10 years in these analyses we found that 173 people commit suicide from Subway 
compare to 21 people from Light Rail. It is a little bit over 8:1 ratio. The suicide that 
caused injuries from 2002 to 2011 is still higher for Subway compare to Light Rail. It is 
important to notice that National Transit Database, there are no reports for suicide from 
2002 to 2007. It is arguable that the increased number of fatalities due to suicide in the 
subway might represent an anomaly. It is difficult to mitigate against a potential suicide, 
nor is that the sole determinant of safety policy.  
Suicide has been reported as an important cause of rail accidents. According to 
FTA (2009), suicide is a major cause of heavy rail accidents but is not a major cause of 
accident in light rail system. Between 2003 and 2005 some 200 suicide accidents 





(FTA 2006). The possible reason is the speed of heavy rail that attracts the suicide 
attempters. 
When comparing the suicide rate that end up in injury and fatality, the author 
concluded that NTD did not start to pay attention to it until 2008. Figure 4.12 illustrated 
that between 2008 and 2009 the suicide injury rate for light rail decreased but there were 
a big increase from 2009 to 2010. There was a small decrease from 2010 to 2011.  The 
subway suicide injury rate increased from 2008 to 2010 but started to decrease from 
2010. 
For Figure 4.13, the suicide fatality for light rail has been increased since 2008, 
but it increased from 2008 to 2009, decreased from 2009 to 2010 and increased again 
from 2010 to 2011 for subway.  Prior to 2008, the transit agencies did not have to report 
the number of suicide. Based on the accident, the agencies reported suicide as trespasser 
or other. After 2008 the system changed on how suicide needed to report. The agencies 
started reporting suicide as suicide. But when NTD gets the information, the data has to 
be clear. If the information is not clear, the agencies would need to have witnesses on site 




















      Figure 4.12 Total suicide injury rate for subway and light rail from 2002 to 2011. 
 
 









One of the major issues in the rail system is trespasser.  From 2003 to 2004 the 
trespasser injury rate for light rail was doubled. It decreased in 2005 and increased again 
from 2005 to 2007. For subway, the trespasser rate decreased from 2002 to 2004; it 
stayed at a low rate since 2004 until it reached zero in 2008.  The trespasser fatality rate 
went up and down from 2002 to 2008 for both systems. It came to the author’s attention 
that from 2008 to 2011, the trespasser rate for both systems was zero but the suicide rate 
was up. (See Figures 4.14 and 4.15)After 2008, the way, that the trespasser used to 
reported, has changed. The transit agencies started to report trespassers as other or 
pedestrians crossing the tracks or walking along the tracks. 
 
 















5.1 Summary Analysis  
Transit incidents, fatalities and injuries vary considerably from year to year, especially 
when viewed alone, without consideration of the volume of ridership. However, the true 
pictures of transit safety for various modes start to emerge when the simple accident or 
fatality numbers are converted into various operating contexts. As shown in Figure 4.7, 
the accident rate, injury rate and fatality rate per million PMT for LRT are consistently 
higher than those of subway. The clear difference is highlighted by converting the total 
number of accidents, injuries and fatalities into a unique platform or consistent unit. This 
conclusion is also consistent with general expectations as subway usually operates in 
exclusive right-of-way but LRT is in mixed traffic, which has higher risk exposure. The 
simple process presented in this manuscript demonstrates that it is possible to derive 
reasonable and consistent safety performance measures in order to compare different 
transportation, especially transit, modes. It is clear that the total number of accidents or 
injuries may vary from year to year and the operations may grow at different rates. When 
a common denominator, such as an accident rate per million PMT, is used, it is much 
easier to compare the safety performance of different modes. 
From the figures of total incidents, fatalities and injuries per million passenger 
miles traveled by each mode, there is a trend that can be found. Though passenger fatality 
rate caused by subway and light rail were closely similar which 0.0004 average passenger 





per year for subway, total incident rate, passenger injury rate, total injury rate and total 
fatalities rate caused by light rail were much higher than the one caused by the subway. 
From 2006 to 2011, in Figure 4.7 shows that when there is an incident happened related 
to light rail or subway, the risk that it will lead to death to passengers is higher in subway 
compared to light rail.  
Overall, subway is much safer than light rail in the aspects of risk of incidents, 
injuries and fatalities rate. The number of total incidents injuries and fatalities for subway 
are much higher than the ones for light rail, but when you compare their rate, the subway 
has the lower risk.  This analysis proves that when comparing the two dominant modes of 
transportation in the US that subways are safer than Light Rail. Subways have dedicated 
rights of ways, signal dedication and infrastructure that is totally separate from any other 
mode of transport. Subways do have an overall higher fatality number but, that is due part 
to subways having larger capacities for users. When an accident occurs, the probability of 
injury or fatality will be higher. 
 
Most light rail fatalities tend to be not passengers, but individuals in other 
categories, such as illegal trespassers, suicide and motorists that violate safety laws or 
regulations. Also, though the passenger injury is a major component of all injuries, 
passenger fatalities caused by subway does not take a big part in total fatalities. To some 
extent, it shows that subway passengers face a lower risk of death and incidents and 
injuries per Million PMT compared to light rail passengers 
As a result of accidents, injuries and fatalities, various controls have been put in 





training, safety commissions, safety campaigns, awareness training, periodic workshops 
for continuous improvement are some of the ways United State Transit is working to 
ensure that their employees and passengers are engrained with a culture of safety. 
Through fundamental positive changes in safety performance, the transit agency can 
adapt and grow and continue to enhance their reputation. 
 
5.2 Safety Performance of Light Rail versus Subway 
To compare the safety performance of light rail and subway system, it is important to 
take into account a number of factors defining safety performance. One very popular way 
of defining safety performance is to examine the frequency of accidents. In the present 
study, when comparison was made between total accidents of subway and light rail 
system two very important trend were observed. From 2002 to 2005, there were a lot of 
accidents occurring in the light rail system, but 2006 saw a remarkable decline in 
accident occurrence and from that year, though there is continuous increase in the total 
number of light rail accidents, the situation is not as bad as was earlier. The decline in the 
accident rate in 2006 can be attributed to the safety action plan introduced by FTA in the 
same year that placed the reduction of collision to be its first priority. A closer view on 
the number of accidents from 2003 to 2008 with respect to accident type is shown in 
Figure 5.1 below. As can be seen, the decline in the number of accident in 2006 was 


























Rail-grade Collisions Other Collisions Derailment
Fire Other*
 
Figure 5.1 Number of accidents by accident type (2003-2008). 
Source: FTA, 2009, p. 4  
* Other accidents include suicide and trespassing-related fatalities; homicides; non-fire -related 
evacuations; and other fatality or multiple-injury accidents that are not considered Collisions, 
Derailments, or Fires 
 
 
Also, the data on frequency of accidents clearly shows that the increase in the 
number of heavy rail accidents is at much higher level than the increase in the number of 
light rail accidents.  This might be due to the higher capacity of the heavy trains and its 
high speed because of which the chances of injuries and fatalities in an incident increases. 
After reviewing the data from 2003 to 2008, FTA (2009) reported that in total some 348 
people died in heavy rail accidents while only 139 died in rail road accidents, showing 
that there were more than double deaths caused by heavy rail accidents than by light rail 
accidents despite the fact that the number of accidents in light rail (2747) was much 
higher than the number of accidents in heavy rail (918).  
The major cause of these accidents was found to be suicide (FTA 2009). Also, the 
large number of fatalities in heavy rail accidents is mainly due to suicide. Table 5.1 





occurred due to suicide. It clearly shows the increase in the suicide rates in past few 
years. This explains the growing rate of accidents as well as fatalities of heavy rail 
accidents in past few years. 
 
Table 5.1 Fatalities and Injuries in Traffic Accidents due to Suicide 
Year Total number of fatalities  Total number of injuries  
2002 15 18 
2003 15 11 
2004 16 0 
2005 7 0 
2006 12 27 
2007 23 16 
2008 27 15 
2009 49 23 
2010 52 39 
2011 79 38 
  
 
The present study has also compared the number of fatalities or injuries occurred 
in the accidents of these two rail systems from 2002 through 2011. This measure can be 
used to benchmark the severity of accidents. According to the data reported by NTA, 
light rail is safer mode of transport as there are very few fatalities in light rail accidents, 





into account the large capacity of users in subway system, it appears to have much lesser 
safety risk then in light rail system. According to FTA (2009), most of the people that die 
in these accidents are non-passenger publics including the motorists, trespasser and 
patrons.   
Turning to the specific factors with respect to both rail system and their 
relationship with the accident rates and frequencies, evidence is clear that numerous 
factors play roles in accident occurrences. Some of these factors are equally applicable to 
both light and heavy rail system but some factors are specifically associated with the 
accident occurrence in either light rail or heavy rail system.  
According to “2009 Rail Safety Statistical Report” (FTA 2009), there is 
noticeable difference in the accidents rates of light rail and heavy rail system with respect 
to the type of accidents. In heavy rail system the rate of rail grade collision is very low 
and remained below 0.02 throughout 2003-2008. However, rail grade crossing collisions 
is the most common cause of accidents in light rail system and there is a significant rise 
in the rail grade collisions from 2003 to 2008 (16.78 to 26.32). In comparison, the rate of 
accidents caused by suicide, trespassing-related fatalities, homicides and other factors not 
including collisions, derailments and fires is very high in heavy rail system, reaching 
around 1.03 in 2007. Such factors play not much important role in the light rail accidents 
where rail grade collision or non-rail grade collisions are the main type of accidents. A 
previous report by FTA (2006) has also reported collision to be the major cause of 
accidents, deaths and injuries in light rail system. 
Several reasons have been identified leading to such accidents. In general, traffic 





cause of traffic accidents. Evans (2004), for example, summarizes the findings of two 
large independent studies undertaken in the U.S. and U.K. In both studies driver behavior 
was found to be either the sole or contributing cause of more than 90% of crashes. 
Wilson and Norris (2006) reviewed a number of studies specifically on rail accidents and 
also reported rail operator’s behavior including attentiveness, care, recognition of signals, 
and ability to make right decision with respect to the signals as important factors related 
to rail accidents. Similarly Hursh, Fanzone and Raslear (2011) found a strong and 
significant relationship between the level of rail operator’s fatigue and the frequency and 
severity of rail accidents.  
Studies not only focused on the behavior of rail operators and other workers of 
rail agencies but found passenger behavior to be another important cause of such 
accidents. FTA (2009) reported that in all the passenger fatalities between 2003 to 2008 
in rail accidents were due to the factors associated with either passenger-behavior, of 
which some 43% accidents were due to medical problems with the passenger and 21% 
were found to be slip and fall accidents. However, it is important to note that all these 
passenger fatalities were caused by the heavy rail accidents except one in which case a 
passenger died by slipping from the light rail. Passenger behavior was also found to be 
one major cause of accidents that led to public (non-passenger) fatalities (FTA 2009) 
Risky action taken by motorists is found to be one of the major causes of rail 
grade crossing collisions and, in many of these accidents, it is the motorists who die. 
Private automobiles drivers and public bus drivers must understand that by doing 





The other important causes were identified as vehicle failures (e.g., brakes and 
tires), environmental factors (e.g, weather and lighting), and roadway factors (e.g., design 
and condition). The vehicle-specific attributes that are known to influence rail accident 
risk include vehicle age, model year, and configuration. Older vehicles and old models 
have been reported to be over- represented in crashes relative to the newer models 
(Zeegeret al. 1994; Chang &Yeh 2005). Failure of safety equipment is another important 
cause of rail accidents, in particular derailment and fire accidents. According to FTA 
(2009) some 80 derailment accidents and some 89 fire accidents in rail were occurred due 
to equipment failure. 
Change in weather or climate condition can also led to rail road traffic accidents 
but it is a relatively less important factor because the number of accident caused by this 
factor are relatively very low. From 1995 to 2005 only 861 railroad accidents, including 
all modes or rail traffic, occurred due to weather condition (Rossetti, n.d.). However, 
indirectly these weather conditions can play a significant role in accident causation. For 
instance, floods and flash floods produce damage on rail tracks, high temperature in 
summer can develop heat kinks in railroad tracks, cold temperate can result in blockage 
of train lines, thunderstorm can cause damage to safety equipment, and other similar 
issues (Rossetti 2002) 
Rossetti (n.d.) also looked into the frequency of the rail accidents with respect to 
the time of day and found that in all rail accidents that occurred between 1995 to 2005, 
most of the accidents occurred from early afternoon to evening (Around 2:00 p.m. to 6 








Figure 5.2 Effect of Time of day on the cause and frequency of occurrence of rail 
accidents in US during 1995-2005 
Source: Rossetti, M.A. (n.d.). Analysis of Weather Events on US Railroads. 
Cambridge, MA: Volpe National Transportation System Center 
 
 
Railroad crossings are reported to the main site of collision accidents. A recent 
study has found that the main cause of collisions at railroad crossing in the light rail 
system is the illegal and abrupt turns made by the motor vehicle drivers in front of 
approaching light rail (Ogden et al. 2007). It was found that the turning traffic is often 
controlled through left and right turn arrow signal which might not be an appropriate way 
to inform them about the approaching light rail. The study suggests a number of measures 
like flashing light signals, automatic gates, and audible signals in form of bell or horn (as 
light rail are not much noisy) for motorists safety. Also, the study gives importance to the 





pavement markings and texturing, refuge areas, and fixed message signs for pedestrian 
safety. However, BNSF (n.d.) reported that more than half of grade crossing collisions on 
BNSF in 2010 were on the grade collision where there were active flashing light signals 
as well as automatic doors. This indicates the need of more measures like a system to 
ensure the compliance of motor vehicle rules in these crossing and reduction of at-grade 
crossings.  
The data indicate continual increase after 2007 in the frequency of accidents, 
injuries and fatalities in both mode of system, though at different rates. A particular 
reason for this has not yet been identified but it could be due to the increase in the 
number of passenger and vehicles miles as well as vehicle revenue hours. All these 
factors show increase in the railroad operation indicating the need to analyze the rail 
safety taking into consideration the number of passenger as well as miles travel by each 
mode of rail transport.  
5.3 Policy Implications 
From this extensive and detailed review of statistical and research data on the safety 
performance of light and heavy rails system, it can be concluded that both modes of 
transport pose a different type of threat. Light rail that has been reported in previous 
studies to be a safer mode of transport is found to be more risky than subway system. 
Although the number of fatalities and injuries are much lesser in light rail system, it is 
mainly because of the low speed and low capacity for passengers. With limited number 
of passengers travelling in light rail, it is not surprising that in case of accident there is 





Collision between light rail and other automobiles have been found to be the 
major type of accidents in light rail. One main cause of such collisions in the light rail 
system is because it does not have its own right of way and it travels along with other 
vehicles on the road. Also, many of these collisions occur at rail road crossing. Safety 
policies for ensuring the decrease in number of collision can make the light rail the safest 
mode of travelling in future.  
The policy makers must understand that the chances of fatality are much higher in 
the subway system as compared to light rail system due to high speed of heavy rail and 
the higher capacity for passengers. Although with the large number of passengers 
travelling through heavy rail system made the percentage of fatalities with respect to total 
number of passenger quite low, it is important to understand that the life of every single 
person is important and efforts must be made to make the heavy rail system even more 
secure for passengers and for public.  
The study has found that the human factor particularly driver and passenger risky 
behavior and worker fatigue critically affect the occurrence of accidents. Important 
measures to be taken for reducing the workers behavioral problems causing rail accidents 
were found to be reduction in the work load over employees of rail agencies, 
development of official training program on safety and security particularly for rail 
operators, selection of rail operator after their behavioral analysis, and development of 
safety culture in the organizations. Public education program needs to be introduced as 
well to make general public aware of the safety measures they should take while 





The present study has created new directions for the future research on safety 
performance of rail system. First, it highlights the importance of human factor and 
encourages the future researcher to compare different modes of rail system or traffic to 
see the relative importance of human factors in occurrence of accidents. Second, the 
study has compared the safety performance of just mode of transportation. Future 
comparative studies should include commuter rail as well as other mode of transport to 
find out the safety performance of transport in USA. It is also important to note that the 
previous method of measuring safety performance through number of accidents, injuries 
and fatalities is proved by the present study to give only partial view on safety 
performance. A comprehensive view including rate of accident, injuries and fatalities 
with respect to, capacity, passenger and vehicle miles and other similar factors gives 
more reliable findings on the subject.  
 
5.4 Recommendations 
The researcher has gained a lot of knowledge about the factors causing the occurrence of 
accidents in both light rail system and in subway system. In this section, suggestions have 
been made to avoid those causal factors to ensure safety and security for railway workers 
and passengers as well as general public.  
For light rail safety plan, there should be increased emphasis on the reduction of 
railroad grade crossing – the main site of accident occurrence. One very important 
recommendation for reducing the collision between light rail and other vehicles is to 
install necessary signs on the road for informing the motor driver in advance about the 





vehicles, it is important that the route of light rails should be developed in a way that the 
motorist or pedestrian coming from the side roads can see the approaching light rail. 
Also, some laws need to be made for reducing the number of rail road crossings. The 
study also recommends development of a rail grade crossing safety management system 
that not only takes care of the maintenance of railroad crossing safety equipment but also 
ensures the enforcement of traffic rules in such crossings. Measures needs to be taken at 
community level to make people, particularly motor drivers, understand the importance 
of following traffic rules at rail grade crossing for their own safety. Some public 
education program should specifically focus on how a motorist can confirm that it will be 
safe to cross the road when there is a light rail approaching.  
Since subway system poses higher risk of death or injury in case of accidents, it is 
important that the any safety management plan must give priority to the reduction of 
heavy train accidents. For reduction of derailment accidents, proper and timely 
maintenance of vehicle as well as safety management equipment is needed. However, one 
important cause of growing fatalities in heavy rail accidents are suicide relating to the 
growing suicide rates in the country. Reduction of suicide rate is beyond the control of 
rail agencies but they can take measure to reduce the use of heavy rail system for suicide. 
The study recommends that for reduction of suicide heavy rail accidents, a thorough 
research must be conducted to determine the most common ways these suicide attempts 
were made in the past and then take practical measures to reduce the probability of 
occurrence of those common methods of suicide. For instance, if most of the suicide 
accidents occurred when a person jumped in front of train, the agencies must add fences 
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